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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1965 case of White v. Crool a federal court, declaring that jury 
service was considered to be "one of the basic rights and obligations of 
citizenship" and "a form of participation in the processes of government, a 
responsibility and a right that should be shared by all citizens, regardless of 
sex, invalidated an Alabama statute excluding women from juries under the 
Equal Protection Clause. This groundbreaking case marked the first use of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a sex-discrimination law. 
White v. Crook involved the trial of a member of the Ku Klux Klan who 
was chared with killing two civil rights workers after a march in Selma, 
Alabama. The trial was to be held in Lowndes County, where the population 
was eighty-one percent black, but no black man or woman of any race had ever 
been called or served on a jury.3 Despite demands by the American CivilLiberties Union (ACLU) that the trials of the alleged murderers be delayed 
t Samantha Barbas has a PhD in U.S. History from the University of California Berkeley. 
She is the author of two books and several academic articles on topics related to law, 
American culture, and history. The author thanks Professor Barbara Babcock for her 
friendship and assistance on this article. 
1. 251 F. Supp. 401 7-8, 11 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
2. News Release, ACLU, (Nov. 22, 1965) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd 
Library, ACLU Papers). 
3. Id. 
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until blacks and women could serve on juries in Alabama, the White Court 
refused to halt the trial, and the verdict, as expected, was not guilty.4 Charles 
Morgan of the ACLU's Operation Southern Justice brought a challenge on 
behalf of a group of black female plaintiffs, contending that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated by the systematic exclusion of African Americans 
from the jury rolls and the jury box, and by the law that excluded all women 
from jury service. 5 The White Court concluded that the sex-discriminatory 
statute, which had been passed on the grounds that jury service would 
improperly take women away from their homes and family responsibilities for 
extended periods, was irrational in light of modem social conditions and 
violated women's right to constitutional equal protection. 
Women's rights groups hailed the decision as a victory, believing that the 
decision could be used to strike down a wide range of sex-discriminatory laws• 6 
and practices. Dorothy Kenyon, a lawyer and feminist activist who had written 
the sex-discrimination brief for the ACLU, considered the outcome 
"magnificent in its impact" and potentially "revolutionary." "Other victories 
will follow. But this one turned the key in the lock. Like the Civil Rights Boys 
when the Brown decision was handed down, I could cry," Kenyon said. 7 
White v Crookrepresented the culmination of Kenyon's career of nearly 
forty years of legal feminist activism. Since the 1920s Kenyon had worked for 
women's social, economic, and political rights, including the right to fair labor. 
To Kenyon, women's economic self-sufficiency was one of the foundations of 
women's "full citizenship." As Kenyon told lecture audiences in the 1930s, the 
ultimate symbol of women's freedom was "the hat that sits upon my head, 
which I have bought and paid for." 8 In the mid-twentieth century, Kenyon was 
one of the best-known feminist activists and progressive intellectuals in the 
country. In the 1950s, she again broke new ground when she linked race and 
sex in a legal argument on behalf of women's rights. Nearly two decades before 
ACLU lawyer Ruth Bader Ginsburg made the claim the basis of her brief in 
Reed v Reed, the first major Supreme Court sex-discrimination case in 1971, 
Kenyon demonstrated the parallels between race and sex discrimination and 
argued that laws based on archaic gender stereotypes, like those based on racial 
stereotypes, stigmatize women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Despite her influence and prominence, Kenyon has been largely ignored in 
4. News Release, ACLU, (Oct. 4, 1965) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd 
Library, ACLU Papers). 
5. Id. 
6. Elizabeth Shelton, CallsRights Decision a Landmarl WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1966. 
7. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Charles Duncan (Mar. 17, 1966) (on file with Smith 
College, Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 28). 
8. Dorothy Kenyon, The Independent Woman (1937) (on file with Smith College, 
Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
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historical and legal scholarship. 9 I suspect that Kenyon's absence can be 
attributed in part to her unruliness as a feminist and as a subject of feminist 
historical inquiry. As a feminist who did much of her women's rights work 
outside of formal feminist organizations and who campaigned against the Equal 
Rights Amendment while advocating for formal sex equality, Kenyon ruptured 
many of the established categories and narratives of legal feminist history. Her 
feminist philosophy blurred the lines between equality and difference 
feminism. Her persistent women's rights efforts and her fruitful alliance with 
male activists in the 1940s and 1950s challenged stereotypes of the era's gender 
conservatism. 
This Article attempts to restore Kenyon to the historical record by 
documenting her complex career and illustrating her importance to modem 
legal feminist thought and activism. It explores how one feminist intellectual 
negotiated the "sameness-difference" debate and how that debate powerfully 
divided women's rights activists in the mid-twentieth century. Kenyon's belief 
that labor laws should single out women for special protection in the 
workplace, yet that women must be treated the same as men in other realms, 
pushed her to search for a legal strategy that would allow for both differential 
and equal treatment for women. The result was Kenyon's Fourteenth 
Amendment theory, which laid the foundation for subsequent legal feminist 
activism in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This Article traces the path Kenyon took as she sought legal tools and 
political allies in her effort to make her feminist vision law. Part I narrates 
Kenyon's career as a pioneering feminist lawyer and activist whose crusade 
centered around women's right to just labor. As Part II demonstrates, much of 
her labor activism focused on her advocacy of protective laws for women 
workers. This perspective put her in direct opposition to feminists advocating 
the Equal Rights Amendment, and between the 1920s and 1960s she was at the 
forefront of a national debate over the meaning of fair labor for women. In Part 
III, I discuss how her support for sex-specific labor laws generated her 
Fourteenth Amendment approach. Kenyon believed that using the Equal 
9. Kenyon's legal feminist work has been discussed in Susan Hartmann's 1997 book, 
The OtherFeminists:Activists in theLiberalEstablismen4which examines women's rights 
activism in the years immediately preceding the rise of second wave feminism in the late 
1960s. Kenyon has been mentioned briefly in other histories-legal scholar Serena Mayeri's 
articles on legal feminist efforts in the 1960s, political scientist Gretchen Ritter's book on 
women's modem struggle for constitutional recognition, and historian Linda Kerber's No 
ConstitutionalRight to Be Ladies, on the history of women's jury service laws. SUSAN 
HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMrSTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT (1998); 
Serena Mayeri, A Common Fateof Discrimination:Race-Gender Analogies in Historical 
Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001); Mayeri, ConstitutionalChoices. Legal Feminism 
and the HistoricalDynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV 755 (2004); KERBER, No 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 
(1998); GRETCHEN RITTER, THE CONSTITUTION AS SOCIAL DESIGN: GENDER AND CIVIC 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2006). 
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Protection Clause to secure women's rights, rather than the Equal Rights 
Amendment, would permit a case-by-case method that would enable the 
eradication of sex-discriminatory laws in jury service, education, and women's 
access to public facilities, while still preserving protective labor policies. This 
in turn led to her model of equal protection litigation that in the wake of Brown 
v. Board ofEducation1 0 hinged on the linkage of race discrimination and sex 
discrimination. 
An overarching theme of the Article is the notion of "constitutional 
culture" and the impact of identity-based social movements on constitutional 
interpretation and legal change. Legal scholar Reva Siegel describes 
constitutional culture as the "network of understandings and practices that 
structure our constitutional tradition, including those that shape law but would 
not be recognized as 'lawmaking' according to the legal system's own formal 
criteria."1 1 Robert Post explains it as a "specific subset of culture that 
about the substance of the Constitution."
' 12 
encompasses extrajudicial beliefs 
According to theorists of constitutional culture, doctrinal innovation occurs not 
only in the isolated world of formal adjudication but works through a polyvocal 
and multidimensional process in which judges interact dynamically with social 
norms and constitutional discourses in the wider culture. A constitutional 
culture approach to legal history sees nonjuridical actors as important 
participants in the production of constitutional meaning. In the twentieth 
century, as legal scholar William Eskridge points out, identity-based social 
movements, such as the civil rights movement and feminist movement, have 
significantly influenced both popular and official understandings of the 
Constitution. 13 As social movements forward their own constitutional 
interpretations and definitions of justice and individual rights, they "challenge 
the background understandings about paradigmatic cases, practices, and areas 
of social life to which principles properly apply."' 4 In their reworking of social 
norms and legal doctrine, they "connect legal norms to the beliefs and practices 
of ordinary people, so as to preserve a relationship between what the law 
regards as licit and what the public does."' 
15 
Although she was not explicitly connected to an organized feminist 
movement, Dorothy Kenyon was among the most influential modem feminist 
interpreters of the Constitution. Like the suffragists of an earlier generation, 
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
11. Reva Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender andthe Constitution from a SocialMovement 
Perspective,150 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 300 (2001). 
12. Robert Post, Fashioningthe Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 
HARV. L. REv. 4, 8 (2003) 
13. William Eskridge, Channeling:IdentityBasedSocialMovements andPublicLaw, 
150 U. PA. L. REv. 419 (2001). 
14. Jack Balkin & Reva Siegel, Principles,Practices,and SocialMovements, 154 U. 
PA. L. REv. 927, 946 (2006). 
15. Id.at 949. 
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Kenyon dedicated herself to transforming both popular and official 
understandings of the Constitution through a dual program of impact litigation• • • 16 . 
and social activism. In addition to her writings and speeches on women's 
rights, Kenyon's formal legal arguments, discussed and publicized in the 
popular press, shifted the conceptual frames through which judicial and 
extrajudicial actors understood women's constitutional rights. In publicizing a 
new vision of gender equality, Kenyon altered women's understanding of 
themselves as gendered legal subjects and contributed to the sense of common 
identity necessary for feminist social mobilization. 17 This Article focuses both 
on the legal arguments Kenyon made and the ways she promoted those ideas 
through formal and informal channels. In her recognition of law and culture as 
mutually constitutive, in her rhetorical techniques, which connected women's 
rights to established constitutional rights traditions, and in her savvy use of 
mass media to promote feminist causes, Kenyon established a model for social 
and legal change that would be followed by later generations of feminist legal 
activists. 
Kenyon's story encourages us to think expansively about feminist legal 
reform, to see it as something that occurs not only in the courtroom but as a 
multifaceted process through which alternative social theories of gender and 
novel doctrinal interpretations are publicized and incorporated into popular and 
18legal discourse, in turn transforming social and legal meanings. Much like the 
prophetic litigation described by law professor Jules Lobel-cases brought by 
lawyers who knew their causes were impossible, but who persevered them in 
order to publicize the issues-Kenyon saw her litigation efforts as a means of 
"speaking to the public." 19 Her ongoing efforts, both in and out of the 
courtroom, to reframe sex discrimination as social injustice and legal wrong 
and to recast the Constitution as a guarantee of women's full citizenship 
changed the law. It also gave rise to a transformative popular consciousness 
that fueled the growth of feminism as a mass social movement. Kenyon's race-
16. On the legal and social activist tactics and arguments used by the women's suffrage 
movement of the nineteenth century, see Adam Winkler, A Revolution too Soon: Women 
SuI agistsandthe 'Living Constitution,'76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1456 (2001), Jack Balkin, How 
Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New 
Departure,39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 27 (2005), and Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the 
Compact oftheFathers Equal Rights, Woman Suflage, and the UnitedStates Constitution, 
1820-1878,74 J. AM. HIST. 836 (1987). 
17. See Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing 
Processesand the Transformationofthe Women's Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. Soc. 
1718 (2006). 
18. As Nicholas Pedriana notes, "the women's movement was not simply trying to 
further engage cultural debate over women's proper roles at work, in the family, and in 
society more broadly; it was also attempting to enshrine those competing cultural 
constructions of gender into law officially recognized and enforced by the state's judicial 
and administrative apparatus." Id.at 1730. 
19. Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools& Prophets. Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 
1331, 1332-33 (1995). 
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sex model shifted the conceptual frames through which Americans viewed the 
unequal treatment of women; her decades-long struggle with the sameness-
difference debate and the practical, moral, and social problems involved in the 
struggle for equal rights not only influenced the social debates of her era but 
presaged the struggles of women's rights activists today. 
PART I 
By World War II Dorothy Kenyon was, in the words of the New York 
Times, one of the "best known women lawyers" in the country and an 
internationally renowned activist working on behalf of a variety of progressive•, • . . . . , • 20 
causes, including worker's rights, civil liberties, and women's rights. Her 
prolific social justice career had started in the 1920s, when Kenyon joined the 
New York League of Women Voters as legal advisor and spearheaded a 
campaign to change a New York law that prohibited all women from serving 
on juries. In the 1930s, she became a prominent member of the American 
Association of University Women and a legal advisor to the Consumers' 
League, the organization that had helped prepare the Brandeis brief limiting 
hours for women workers in the famous 1908 Supreme Court case Muller v 
Oregon.2 1 Kenyon also fought New York laws censoring films as a board 
member of the ACLU. Her prominence as a liberal public intellectual won her 
official appointments in state and municipal government. In the 1930s Kenyon 
served on several state labor commissions, held the position of the Deputy 
Commissioner of Licenses of New York City, and served as a municipal judge. 
In 1946, Kenyon was appointed by President Truman to serve as U.S. 
Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, where she 
focused on education and suffrage rights for women throughout the world.
2 2 
Like many ambitious young women of her time who became social 
reformers, Kenyon's life and social vision were shaped by her own personal 
experience with sex discrimination. The daughter of a family of elite New York 
lawyers and a 1909 graduate of Smith College, Kenyon was a debutante and 
social butterfly whose expected life path was domesticity and marriage. Her life 
changed in 1913, when she witnessed extreme rural poverty while on a trip to 
Mexico. Kenyon then dedicated herself to pursuing social change through legal 
work, and she began her legal studies at New York University Law School in 
1914. She was belittled by professors and students who assumed that she was 
less capable because she was a woman and that her education would be wasted 
because she would marry and never become a lawyer. In 1920, women were a 
small and marginalized minority of the legal profession, with only about 1700 
20. New York Woman GetsLeaguePos4 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1938, at 7. 
21. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
22. Kenyon's r~sum~s can be found interspersed throughout her personal papers at 
Smith College in the Sophia Smith Library. 
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women lawyers in practice nationally. 23 Kenyon was eventually hired as an 
associate at a small New York firm, yet she was troubled by her inability to 
secure interesting work assignments and the constant criticism she received 
from her male colleagues. In 1927, Kenyon opened her own law firm with 
Dorothy Straus, another2 4feminist lawyer. Like many professional women of her 
era, she never married. 
These struggles taught Kenyon the importance of equal opportunity in the 
workplace. Kenyon came to believe that perhaps even more than political and 
social rights, women's rights to pursue their chosen occupation and to secure 
economic self-sufficiency were the bases of women's freedom. Fair labor-
which to Kenyon meant a living wage, a safe workplace, and ideally, personal 
and intellectual challenge-was the foundation on which women achieved self-
realization and independence. Women's freedom meant "the freedom.., to 
decide for themselves what they shall do in the world, to exercise freedom of 
choice in the disposition of their lives, to enjoy the same kind and degree of 
opportunity [as men] to exercise their diverse talents," she told readers of the 
New York Times. Kenyon believed that work allowed women's potentialities 
"to blossom to the undoubted enrichment of our society as a whole." 2 5 She was 
also a staunch advocate of sex equality in higher education, decrying the "great 
graduate schools of medicine and law.., where masculinity reigns 
supreme." 2 6 Believing that women's ignorance of the law was one of the 
primary obstacles to their empowerment, she embarked on a public education 
campaign and during the 1930s and 1940s wrote dozens of articles for popular 
publications and made hundreds of speeches and radio addresses on the subject 
of women's legal rights. In her attempt to "remove the common law disabilities 
of women," which she described as outdated vestiges of a feudal era, she 
worked for the legalization of birth control, revision of the penal code to make 
men equally liable in cases of prostitution, and reform of income tax, divorce,27 
and marital property laws to benefit women. 
When it came to women's intellectual and professional pursuits, Kenyon 
believed that sex-based classifications were never justified and that women 
23. Virginia Drachman, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 179 (1998). 
24. By choice, Kenyon never married. For more on women lawyers' struggles to 
combine work with meaningful personal lives in the early twentieth century, see Drachman, 
Women Lawyers and the Quest for Professional Identity in Late Nineteenth Century 
America, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2414 (1990); "My Partnerin Law andLife": Marriagein the 
Lives of Women Lawyers in Late 19th and Early20th CenturyAmerica, 14 LAW & Soc. 
INQUIRY 221 (1989); The New Woman Lawyer andthe ChallengeofSexual Equality in Early 
Twentieth CenturyAmerica,28 IND. L. REv. 227 (1995). 
25. Text of the Speeches at New York Times Symposium on the WorldAfter the War, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1943, at 16. 
26. Dorothy Kenyon, Saucefor the Goose, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 15, 1936, at 20. 
27. Susan Hartmann, The Odyssey of a Feminist(on file with Smith College, Sophia 
Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 10). 
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must be judged solely on their merits. When a man was appointed president of 
Mount Holyoke College, Kenyon praised the decision but pointed out that the 
"rule of joint participation did not apply to men's colleges. Has anyone ever 
seriously suggested a woman for the presidency of Harvard? Let us urge.., the' 28 
principle of the best person for the job... regardless of the person's sex." 
During the Great Depression Kenyon fought state and federal policies that 
discriminated against married working women on the grounds that they 
competed with male "breadwinners" for scarce employment. Kenyon petitioned 
Congress on behalf of married female postal workers who had been dismissed 
as a cost-cutting measure in 1934. 2 9 She argued that married women should 
seek work because "they need to work just like everybody else and our 
government is based upon the merit principle and that means the employment 
of the best person for the job regardless of sex or any other consideration. 
3 0 
As a member of the Consumers' League, she fought for the abolition of 
"homework" or "piecework," in which typically urban immigrant women, 
working out of their homes, sewed or assembled parts of consumer goods and 
were paid by the piece. She decried such work as little better than "sweatshop" 
labor.3 1 Kenyon also worked throughout her career to secure women's equal 
access to the legal profession, successfully opening the New York Bar 
Association to women in 1937 and speaking at colleges throughout the country 
on the importance of women entering the law. As "the most conservative of the 
professions," she wrote, the law was one of the most resistant to opening its
' 32 
doors to women and "probably the last refuge of the male." 
During World War II, Kenyon waged a successful campaign against a joint 
income tax bill, arguing that it would "threaten the individual freedom ' of33 
women, the ability to be themselves, to retain their own separate identity." 
She believed that World War II, during which six million women entered the 
paid labor force, could potentially be a turning point in women's statuses by 
bringing large numbers of women economic self-sufficiency for the first time. 
If they could retain their jobs after the war, Kenyon believed, women faced an 
extraordinary opportunity to achieve success and personal fulfillment through 
28. Dorothy Kenyon, Changing Status of Women (1936) (on file with Sophia Smith 
Library, Smith College, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
29. Dorothy Kenyon, Some Economic Aspects of Mayor's Plan Affecting Married 
Women (1934) on file with Smith College, Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, 
Box 19). 
30. Dorothy Kenyon, Notes for Democratic Regional Conference (1939) (on file with 
Smith College, Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
31. Dorothy Kenyon, Untitled (1935) (on file with Smith College, Sophia Smith 
Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
32. Dorothy Kenyon, Medieval or Modem-Which? (1933) (on file with Smith 
College, Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
33. Memorandum from Dorothy Kenyon in Opposition to Proposal to Require 
Compulsory Joint Income Tax (Mar. 25, 1942) (on file with Smith College, Sophia Smith 
Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 20). 
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the pursuit of meaningful careers. "Women must be in the world," she told 
audiences in 1943. "Women must have both homes and careers [and] there is' 34 
no incompatibility between the two." 
Yet despite her egalitarian commitments, she supported differential 
treatment for women working in service and industrial jobs-what she 
described as "sweated labor." Like many privileged reformers of her era, 
Kenyon believed that maternity leave, minimum wage, and maximum hour 
laws for women working in industry were necessary protections against long 
hours and economic exploitation. Women needed special protection because of 
their weaker bodies and their status as mothers or potential mothers; there were 
"certain elemental physical differences between men and women which no 
application of brains or democratic techniques is likely to ever wipe out," she35 
explained. As a socialist, Kenyon believed that safeguards for low-wage 
women workers were an important step in securing state protection for all 
workers. Even more, women lacked the protection of the major labor unions, 
which excluded them on the basis of sex. Whether protective laws, which had 
been passed by the majority of states, actually helped working women has been 
much debated. Historian Nancy Cott has suggested persuasively that while the 
laws did in fact improve conditions for many women in industry, they also 
limited women's work opportunities by making women more expensive to hire 
and perpetuating the idea that women were "dependent and secondary wage
3 6 
earners." 
Kenyon's attitude towards working-class women reflected her own class 
privilege. Kenyon believed that housewives supported by well-paid husbands 
and professional women workers had a responsibility to "protect" their less 
fortunate working-class sisters. Though sex-specific legislation might be a 
"humiliation to women" working in a professional context, such distinctions 
were "humane" for blue-collar women. She explained, "if the world's 
experience shows that such legislation does in truth help to pull [low-wage 
women workers] out of the morass, have I got any business letting my pride 
stand in the way? Isn't it rather their pride, not mine that matters?" 3 7 As she 
told audiences of educated white working women, "it is important to visualize 
our new freedom, not alone in terms of the hat that sits upon my head, and 
which I have bought and paid for, but also in terms of what it means to these 
other working women."3 8 She assumed that working-class mothers with young 
34. Dorothy Kenyon, Untitled (Oct. 1943) (on file with Smith College, Sophia Smith 
Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
35. EqualRi'hts:ADebate, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1944, at SM 14. 
36. Nancy Cott, FeniistPoliticsinthe 1920s: The National Woman's Party 71 J. 
AM. HiST., 1,61 (1984); Alice Kessler-Harris, OUT TO WORK: A I-STORY OF WAGE EARNING 
WOMEN INTHE UNITED STATES 194 (1982). 
37. Dorothy Kenyon, The Woman's Charter (July 23, 1937) (on file with Smith 
College, Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
38. Kenyon, supranote 8. 
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children would not want to combine work and family as professional women 
often did, but would rather stay at home, and she never once broached the 
problem of inadequate child care. She also did not believe that men and women 
should share equally in child care. While she advocated a state-funded 
"mothers' pension" providing secure income to stay-at-home mothers, she 
abhorred the idea of a similar fathers' pension "so that he can stay at home to 
change the baby's diddies." 39 Consistent with the attitudes of many privileged 
white reformers at the time, she was also blind to the struggles of working 
women of color. It was not until the 1960s and her partnership with African 
American civil rights attorney Pauli Murray, her partner on White v. Crook that 
she considered the dual oppression at the intersection of race and sex 
discrimination. 
PART II 
Kenyon's advocacy of protective labor laws for women threw her into the 
contentious debate over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Between its 
introduction in 1923 and 1981, which marked the end of its failed ratification 
campaign, the ERA, which stated that "equality of the law shall not be abridged 
by the United States or any state on account of sex," was a major focus of 
feminist activism. It was deeply polarizing, and it provoked significant debate 
among progressives and feminists. In the 1920s and 1930s the National 
Woman's Party (NWP), which became famous for its militant tactics during the 
suffrage campaign of the 1910s, was the primary backer of the ERA, while a 
coalition of organizations allied with the Women's Bureau in the Department 
of Labor opposed it. ERA advocates argued that women's social and legal 
equality could only be ensured if it were written into the Constitution. A 
"blanket amendment" would not only invalidate all sex-based classifications at 
once but would represent an important symbolic national commitment to equal
40 
rights. 
ERA opponents like Kenyon, often described as "social feminists" by 
historians, agreed that discrimination against women in many areas, such as 
jury service and divorce and inheritance laws, should be eradicated, but that 
many sex-based distinctions, such as female hour and wage laws, maternity 
benefits, widow's pensions, and laws making family support the responsibilit 
of the husband, were necessary for women's health and economic survival. 
Social feminists believed that women must be active in the workplace and 
39. Dorothy Kenyon's draft of article in WOMAN'S DAY, June 1943 (on file with Smith 
College, Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
40. On the ERA in the 1920s, see Joan Zimmerman, The JurisprudenceofEquality 
The Women's inimum Wage, the FirstEqualRightsAmendment, andAdkins v. Children's 
Hospital, 1905-1923, 78 J. AM. HMST. 188, 188 (1991). 
41. Nancy Cott, hat'sina Name? The Limits of 'SocialFeminism' orExpandingthe 
Vocabularyof Women's History,76 J. AM. IST.809, 811 (1989). 
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public life, but that women's unique biology and status as mothers merited 
special legal protection. In contrast, the "egalitarian feminists" of the NWP 
argued for the intellectual and dispositional similarities between women and 
men and opposed differential legal treatment of women. Sex-specific laws, 
even those that purported to help women, robbed women of their right to be 
regarded as individuals. In addition to creating disincentives for the hiring of 
women, protective legislation reinforced notions of female dependency and 
justified women's second-class citizenship. 
42 
As popular and congressional support for the ERA mounted during World 
War II, Kenyon became one of the Amendment's most vocal opponents. As she 
explained to Woman's Daymagazine, "I am so utterly for equal rights that if I 
thought the amendment could do the slightest bit of good I would be for it." 
Rather than "waste precious time" debating with other women the "dubious 
merits of this perennial proposal," she explained: 
I console myself with working strenuously for.., helping women 
doctors get commissions in the armed forces.., fighting to get 
women appointed to policy making positions, seeking to be as good a 
lawyer... as I can possibly be in the hopes of thereby securing 
greater recognition for women in the professions. These are the real 
battlefronts in our fight for woman's freedom. 
4 3 
To Kenyon, formal sex equality in the workplace produced substantive 
inequalities. Differential treatment was not a sign of inferiority, but rather a 
sign of women's power: "It is a mark of recognition, a flag run up to call 
attention to the fact that women have arrived politically... and are very much 
in the picture and a factor to be reckoned with."
4 4 
After World War II, Kenyon headed the National ACLU's Committee on 
Discrimination A~ainst Women in Employment, begun in 1944 as a means to 
defeat the ERA. The ACLU, which had historically allied itself with labor 
and had a strong labor constituency that supported protective labor laws for 
women, opposed the ERA. 
Along with twenty-seven pro-labor organizations allied in 1945 in a 
National Committee to Defeat the Unequal Rights Amendment, the ACLU's 
Committee promoted as an alternative to the ERA a "Women's Status Bill" that 
would declare a federal legislative policy prohibiting discrimination based on 
sex except "as reasonably justified by differences in physical structure, 
biological or social function," thus preserving protective labor laws.4 6 Around 
42. SUSAN BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 144 (1981). 
43. Kenyon, supranote 39. 
44. Kenyon, supranote 8. 
45. ACLUBacks Women's StatusBill,ACLU WEEKLY BULLETIN, (ACLU, New York, 
N.Y.) Apr. 14, 1947, at 1277 (on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library). 
46. Questions and Answers on the Women's Bill, (Nat'l Comm. to Defeat the Unequal 
Rights Amendment) (Apr. 10, 1947) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library). 
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this time Kenyon also began to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment could be 
used to protect women against arbitrary and invidious sex discrimination, 
making the ERA unnecessary. Using the Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle 
for women's equality, Kenyon argued, would potentially allow the elimination 
of many discriminatory laws dealing with women's rights in marriage, divorce, 
property ownership, and jury service without disturbing protective labor 
legislation. 
Kenyon knew that her Fourteenth Amendment approach would face 
challenges. The Supreme Court had upheld nearly every sex-discriminatory 
state law that had been challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment since 
Miinor v Happersett,in which nineteenth century suffragists had argued that 
restrictions on women's suffrage violated the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. 47 In 1947, the Court in Fay v New York upheld a New York law that 
required women who wanted to serve on juries to register with the state, even 
though the policy in practice kept large numbers of women off the rolls. 48 In 
Goesaert v Cleary, the Court validated a Michigan statute that prohibited 
women from being bartenders unless they were the wives or daughters of male 
bar owners, holding that such discrimination was not "irrational." Despite the 
wartime expansion of equal protection doctrine in the area of race 
discrimination and the Court's willingness to reevaluate the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in light of contemporary racial attitudes, it refused to 
apply comparable equal protection analysis to sex. The conservative social 
climate of the postwar era posed further obstacles to Kenyon's strategy. As 
Americans came to idealize domesticity, as women war workers were laid off 
en masse, and as the nation entered into the "baby boom" and focused on 
family life after the disruption of the war, support for feminist goals and 
membership in feminist organizations dwindled.5 0 Working without the 
support of an organized feminist movement, Kenyon pursued her women's 
rights efforts in relative isolation. 
In the 1950s, defeating the ERA remained the focus of the ACLU's and 
Kenyon's women's rights efforts. In 1948, both House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees reported on the ERA favorably, and Senate passage seemed likely. 
As a leading member of the Equality Committee, the civil rights committee 
under which the Committee on Women in Discrimination had been subsumed, 
Kenyon continued to argue that the ERA would jeopardize important protective 
legislation for women and that the Fourteenth Amendment made the ERA 
47. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874). But see Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of 
D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding that federal minimum wage legislation for women was 
an unconstitutional violation of liberty of contract), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
48. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). 
49. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
50. See generallyVertaTaylor, SocialMovement Continuity. The Women's Movement 
in Abeyance, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 761 (1989). 
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unnecessary. 
51 
Kenyon began searching for a sex discrimination case to bringbefore the Supreme Court under her Fourteenth Amendment theory. 
PART III 
Kenyon's opposition to the ERA and the declining, polarized women's 
rights movement led Kenyon to focus her feminist efforts in the 1950s within 
the ACLU. As historian Susan Hartmann illustrates, this was not an uncommon 
strategy for feminist activists in this era; in the absence of a broad-based 
grassroots women's rights movement and strong, formal feminist 
organizational structures, many feminists pursued women's rights goals within 
male-dominated liberal organizations. Women in the National Council of 
Churches, the International Union of Electrical Workers, and the ACLU, 
among other groups, drew on their organizations' financial, intellectual, and 
publicity resources to work towards such goals as equal pay for women, greater 
rights and opportunities for married women workers, and increased 
representation of women in politics, the professions, and union leadership. 
52 
These efforts were not only important in raising public consciousness on 
feminist issues but in preparing the organizations to take on greater women's 
rights activism in the coming decades. Despite the benefits of working within 
established structures, however, these feminists were often disadvantaged by 
their separation from other women activists and their struggles with male 
leaders. Kenyon benefited from the ACLU's legal expertise and resources, and 
its well-established civil rights and civil liberties philosophy allowed her to 
create intellectual and strategic connections between feminist reforms and 
broader progressive goals. At the same time, Kenyon struggled to convince 
many of the ACLU leaders of the importance of women's rights. 
The search for an ideal sex discrimination case engaged Kenyon and her 
two strongest male allies in the National ACLU, associate director Alan 
Reitman, previously a labor lawyer with the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, and Rowland Watts, legal director for the ACLU and former 
president of the Workers' Defense League. Reitman and Watts were crucial in 
bringing Kenyon's interest in litigating a sex discrimination case to the 
attention of the National ACLU Board, which generally regarded women's 
rights as a non-issue or as diverting attention from the more important issue of 
racial equality. Kenyon, Reitman, and Watts were only able to convince the 
Board to recognize the importance of women's rights by drawing connections 
between women's rights and the rights of racial minorities. 
In considering possible test cases, Kenyon moved cautiously. Kenyon 
dismissed a suggestion to challenge the Edison Company's ban on the 
51. 1955 Restatement of ACLU's Position on Equal Rights (ACLU, New York, N.Y.) 
(on file with Smith College, Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 28). 
52. See HARTMANN, supranote 9. 
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employment of married women, responding that the issue posed "great 
difficulty" as a potential test case because it dealt with the practices of a private 
company. "A further difficulty is in the fact that the ground here is not sex ,, • 54 
but marital status," she explained. She continued: 
Whatever we may think of the policy of a business which excludes 
married women, we must admit that there may be something in what 
they say about greater absences and so on. In other words, we may not 
think that their policy is wise but it is hard to maintain that it is utterly 
unreasonable. I think we can find better cases to fight discrimination 
against women in. 55 
In the mid-1950s Reitman received a letter from a female public school 
teacher in Kansas who was protesting a state law that provided male teachers 
an annual salary $400 above equally qualified women teachers. She asked 
Reitman, "Since the Supreme Court prohibits unfair treatment because of color, 
is it also natural to prohibit unfair wages because of sex? Would a test case 
have any chance at all in Court?" 56 Though Kenyon believed that the law might 
be declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, the plan fell 
through when the women teachers refused to serve as plaintiffs in the action.
57 
Reitman also brought to Kenyon's attention a Hoboken, New Jersey law 
restricting the employment of female bartenders unless they were closely 
related to the owner. Kenyon was hesitant to pursue it because "it has an 
aspect of morals to it. It would be nice ifwe could only stay clear of morals and 
get a clean cut case on discrimination against women without that factor in it to 
muddy the waters." 59 Reitman wrote back, half-cynically, "I guess women's 
rights will have to wait!" 
60 
Aware that women's economic self-sufficiency hinged on reproductive 
rights, Kenyon also fought for safe and legal abortions. One of the 
unacknowledged pioneers of the abortion rights movement, she advocated 
abortions on demand long before the feminist movement made it a rallying cry 
in the late 1960s. In the 1950s, Kenyon brought up the subject of abortion law 
53. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Louis Joughin (June 5, 1957) (on file with 
Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Letter from Madge Bruce to ACLU (Mar. 25, 1957) (on file with Princeton 
University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers). 
57. Letter from Alan Reitman, Assoc. Dir., ACLU, to Madge Bruce (Sep. 11, 1957); 
Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Rowland Watts, Legal Dir., ACLU (Oct. 1, 1957) (on file 
with Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers). 
58. See Letter from Alan Reitman, Assoc. Dir., ACLU, to Dorothy Kenyon (June 4, 
1956) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers). 
59. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Alan Reitman, Assoc. Dir., ACLU (June 8, 1956) 
(on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers). 
60. Letter from Alan Reitman, Assoc. Dir., ACLU, to Dorothy Kenyon (June 14, 1956) 
(on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers). 
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reform with the ACLU Board, telling her colleagues that a "woman should 
have the right to determine whether or not she should bear a child" and that this 
was an "important individual right." They responded by saying that the topic 
was "not one to which the ACLU should properly devote its time."6 1 Kenyon 
was not dissuaded from writing and speaking on the subject, however. In a 
1959 speech, she proclaimed that "poor single women disobey abortion law 
because they do not want stigma or cannot afford a child. What are women? 
Simple breeders? Why not permit them a choice?" 
62 
Kenyon's approach to the Fourteenth Amendment was revolutionized after 
the 1954 landmark decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation, in which the 
ACLU had filed an amicus brief. Bron expanded the scope of equal protection 
by recognizing a new kind of harm-stigmatic harms caused by racial 
discrimination-as impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Bron, 
NAACP lawyers drew on the work of prominent social scientists to claim that 
racial school segregation created a sense of psychologically crippling 
humiliation among black children, a "feeling of inferiority as to their status," 
such that their education was inherently unequal.6 3 The Court, acknowledging 
the validity of the social science data, held that to separate black schoolchildren 
from others generated a "feeling of inferiority .. that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 
64 
The Court's willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of social science 
data documenting the psychological and social effects of race discrimination, to 
reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment in light of changing social standards, 
and to acknowledge stigmatic harms as constitutionally cognizable injuries 
gave Kenyon's strategy new dimensions. Two months after the Brown decision, 
Kenyon set out to establish a legal argument that laws that arbitrarily classified 
on the basis of sex, like racial segregation, stigmatized women as a class in a 
way that violated the Equal Protection Clause. "Perhaps the most hopeful 
portent" for women's rights, Kenyon wrote in a June 1954 ACLU newsletter, 
"lies in the Court's recent interpretation of equality under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as applied to segregation in public schools. With sex instead of 
color pleaded as the basis of discrimination, this amendment-without 
change-might some day turn out to be the very door to equal freedom which
65 
we seek." 
In the coming years Kenyon, working independently, developed the race-
61. DAVID GARRow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF ROE V WADE276 (1998). 
62. Dorothy Kenyon, Speech, The Legal Concept of Equality (1959) (on file with 
Smith College, Sophia Smith Library, Kenyon Papers, Box 19). 
63. Brief of Appellants at 494, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 
4, 10). 
64. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
65. EqualRights for Women, ACLU NEWSLETTER (ACLU, New York, N.Y.) (June 
1954) (on file with Smith College, Sophia Smith Library, Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 28). 
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sex parallel as the basis for her Fourteenth Amendment approach. Following in 
the lines of the strategic litigation model of the civil rights movement, Kenyon 
worked to develop a legal and sociological rationale for the similar legal 
treatment of sex and race and to compile a "sociological record" on sex 
discrimination comparable to the materials used by the NAACP in its anti-
segregation cases. This was difficult, given the state of popular, social 
scientific, and legal thought at the time. In constitutional terms, blacks were a 
"discrete and insular minority" 66  whose historical lack of political 
representation and influence justified heightened judicial solicitude. Women 
were neither a numerical minority nor had they been formally excluded from 
the political process after obtaining the vote in 1920. By the time of Brown, 
many Americans no longer believed that blacks and whites were biologically 
dissimilar in any relevant way, but most still perceived women's lives, goals, 
and temperaments as physically determined. 
Moreover, in contrast to the burgeoning literature on race discrimination, 
there was virtually no work in the 1950s on the psychology of women's 
oppression, making it difficult for Kenyon to construct her "sociological 
record." Sex stereotyping was generally regarded as benign or biologically 
justified. Only one academic, sociologist Helen Mayer Hacker, had argued that 
women's subordination created "personality distortion" in women. Hacker 
presciently described women as a minority group; although not a numerical 
minority, women had been victimized by the same social disrenard and 
internalized shame that had defined the African American experience. 
Despite the lack of sociological data, by the end of the 1950s, Kenyon was 
arguing that legal classifications on the basis of sex that were rooted in archaic 
stereotypes about women and that were not designed to help women achieve 
substantive equality with men injured women psychically by reinforcing 
notions of women's "second class citizenship." While Kenyon continued to 
develop her race-sex theory, she remained without the test case she had been 
searching for. The opportunity finally arose when the ACLU was invited to 
participate in a challenge to a Florida state jury service law that denied women 
the right to participate on the same terms as men. The case, Hoyt v. Florida, 
marked the first major opportunity for Kenyon to link civil rights and women's 
66. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
67. Id. 
68. Helen Mayer Hacker, Women asa Mnority Group, 30 SocIAL FORCES 60 (1951). 
One of the only other writings in this vein was Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma, 
which had briefly described sex discrimination as parallel to race discrimination. Like 
blacks, women had come to believe in their inferiority, and their subordination was 
rationalized by a "myth of contentment" that they enjoyed their second-class status. To cope 
with discrimination, blacks and women adopted deferential manners that concealed their real 
feelings. The "similarities in the women's and the Negroes' problems are not accidental" but 
grew out of a paternalistic social order. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERiCAN DILEMMA 1078 
(Reprint of the 20th anniversary ed., Harper & Row). 
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rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 
In 1957 Gwendolyn Hoyt was convicted of second-degree murder for 
fatally assaulting her husband with a baseball bat. Her lawyers argued that 
because she had been tried by an all-male jury, the result of a permissive jury 
selection statute which required women to register with the state if they wanted 
to serve, she had been deprived of her Fourteenth Amendment right to be heard 
by a jury in which members of her own class had been included in the jury 
pool. Women constituted forty percent of the total electorate and more than half 
the population of the county, but volunteers for jury service constituted less 
than one percent of the women electors. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the 
jury statute on the ground that "[w]hatever changes may have taken place in the 
political or economic status of women in our society, nothing has yet altered 
the fact of their primary responsibility as a class for the daily welfare of the 
family unit upon which our civilization depends." By the time of Hoyt only 
twenty-eight states granted jury service to women on the same terms as men, of 
which seven permitted those with family responsibilities to be excused. Sixteen 
states allowed a woman to be exempt solely on the basis of sex, and three 
Southern states prohibited women from serving altogether. 7 1 Hoyt's appeal to 
the Supreme Court was taken up by Herbert Ehrmann of the Boston law firm 
Goulston and Storrs. The National ACLU and its Florida affiliate agreed to file 
an amicus brief, making it the ACLU's first amicus in a sex-discrimination72 
case. Kenyon believed that sex-discriminatory jury laws were especially 
vulnerable to equal protection challenge because they were based on outdated 
stereotypes of female domesticity, and she took the lead on the brief. 
Hoyt's primary argument was that she had been denied her Fourteenth 
Amendment citizenship right to be tried by a fair cross section of the 
community.73 Kenyon's brief went further, arguing not only the defendant's 
rights but the citizenship rights of the prospective woman juror whose 
exclusion would stigmatize her. 74 Like racial segregation, the exclusion of 
women sent a message to society and to women in particular that they were 
unfit to share citizenship on the same terms as men. It reinforced notions of 
women's inferiority and promoted invidious stereotypes: that women should be 
exclusively domestic, that they were unfit to assume important civic 
responsibilities, that they did not want to participate in public life. The law 
denied a woman both the opportunity for civic involvement and the feeling of 
69. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
70. Hoyt v. State, 119 So. 2d 691, 694 (Fla. 1959). 
71. KERBER, supra note 9, at 168. 
72. Id.at 167-170. 
73. See BARBARA BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, 
PRACTICE, AND THEORY 152 (2d ed.) (1996). 
74. Brief of Appellant at 9, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (on file with Princeton 
University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers, Box 1142) [hereinafter Hoyt Brief]. 
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is performing her duty."
75 
involvement, "the chance to feel that she too 
Restrictive jury laws worked a "genuine humiliation and degradation of [a, ,,76 
woman' s] spirit. 
Kenyon mobilized Brown and the history of women's gradual 
emancipation in the twentieth century to argue that women's rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, like African Americans' rights, must be updated in• 77 
light of contemporary standards. It was one of the first attempts to use 
women's history in a legal argument against sex discrimination.78 In her Hoyt 
brief, Kenyon argued that while exempting all women from juries to care for 
young children and the home might have been appropriate in the nineteenth 
century, it was now "unrealistic and uncalled for."7 9 Revolutionary changes 
had brought about "the advancement and emancipation of women in the last 
century.".8 By the early 1960s, over a third of women were in the workforce, 
and a majority of women workers were married. Mothers with small children 
were only a relatively small percentage of the female population, and judges 
could easily excuse them. The classification "seems to have outlived its time8 1 
and purpose." 
The final statement was a ringing call for women's rights that William 
Eskridge characterized as a cry for "complete rather than token integration into 
the public as well as private institutions of the nation." 82 Kenyon again drew 
parallels between race and sex by invoking the history of the civil rights 
movement and the moral authority of Brown. Just as the Court had disposed of 
the separate but equal doctrine, bringing "a fresh breeze across our national 
life," it was time to admit women to full citizenship. 83 Women had fought a 
"slow and painful battle during the last century and a half for recognition and 
status not very different from that of the Negro slaves." 84 Like Jim Crow, sex 
discrimination also jeopardized America's international credibility. The 
"responsibilities of citizenship are being granted to [women] practically 
everywhere on the same terms as men. Should we in the United States be more 
75. Id. 
76. Id.at 25. 
77. Id.at 26. 
78. Reva Siegel observes that this sort of appeal to history, "as a source of narrative 
understanding, of collective identity, and of practical judgment about constitutional values, is 
a fundamental feature of our constitutional culture, regularly invoked in constitutional 
argument inside and outside the courts." Reva Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitutionfrom a SocialMovementPerspective,150 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 343 (2001). 
79. Hoyt Brief, supra note 74, at 25. 
80. Id.at 20. 
81. Id.at 24. 
82. William Eskridge, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
ConstitutionalLawin the Twentieth Century,100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2127 (2002). 
83. Hoyt Brief, supra note 74, at 30 
84. Id.at 12. 
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backward than the rest of the world in integrating our women?"
' 85 
The Court sustained the conviction, maintaining that there was no 
systematic exclusion and that Hoyt's right to a fair trial had not been impaired. 
"Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and 
protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life 
formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the 
center of home and family life," Harlan wrote in dicta. "We cannot say that it is 
constitutionally impermissible for a state.., to conclude that a woman should 
be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she herself determines .....,86 
that such service is consistent with her own special responsibilities. For 
years, Kenyon decried Harlan's refusal to change the "ancient" rule that "states 
may refuse to allow women to serve on juries and that the matter is really 
undebatable."8 7 "Harlan's opinion was written in letters of fire in my brain," 
she explained to an ACLU colleague. This interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was "subverted by sophistry and twisted interpretation of the 
phrase 'protection of the law,' another example of 'interpretations made by 
men judges influenced by their image or desire to keep women in the home."' Ks 
In Hoy, "we fell flat on our face," Kenyon lamented, hoping that some day in 
the future she would get her revenge. 
Kenyon's argument elicited more support in the court of public opinion. 
Kenyon wrote and lectured publicly on the case, and several popular 
publications, sympathetic to Kenyon's position, decried the Court's decision. 
The New York Times ran an article by a trial lawyer that criticized Hoyt and 
argued that women's presence on juries was essential for the democratic 
process. "If women, in their jury service, do not differ from men, then we 
cannot afford to exclude them any more than men... If their sex in some way 
colors their judgment, then there is all the more reason why we need their 
views, more truly to reflect mass judgment," he concluded. A few months 
later, the New York Times described women as "still second-class citizens," 
lamenting that "in the middle of the twentieth century, women are subject to 
prejudices that smack of the nineteenth century."
' 9 1 
85. Id.at 30. 
86. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961). 
87. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Osmond Fraenkel (Dec. 4, 1970) (on file with 
Smith College, Sophia Smith Library, Kenyon Papers, Box 29, Folder 1). 
88. Dorothy Kenyon, Notes for Article on ERA (on file with Smith College, Sophia 
Smith Library, Kenyon Papers, Box 28, Folder 9). 
89. Dorothy Kenyon, undated speech (on file with Smith College, Sophia Smith 
Library, Kenyon Papers, Box 32). 
90. Louis Nizer, Verdict on Women as Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1962, at SMi I. 
The Court, in earlier cases, had also made overtures towards a more inclusive view of jury 
service. In 1946, in Ballardv United States,decided on statutory grounds, Justice Douglas 
argued in dicta that the presence of women was essential for a representative jury. 329 U.S. 
187, 191-92 (1946). 
91. Lee Graham, Who's In ChargeHere? Not Women!, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 2, 1962, at 
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Kenyon's opportunity for revenge finally came in White v Crook five 
years later. On White, Kenyon worked with Pauli Murray, a pioneering civil 
rights lawyer who drew on Kenyon's race-sex analogy in her 1962 report to the 
President's Commission on the Status of Women, in which she advocated 
litigating women's rights cases under a Fourteenth Amendment civil rights 
model. Kenyon wrote to Charles Morgan of the ACLU's Operation Southern 
Justice that this case was the opportunity she had been looking for. "The one 
thing I am fighting for madly these days is to get discriminations against 
women under the umbrella of the Fourteenth Amendment ....This case gives 
us our perfect chance and we mustn't muff it." 93 It was Kenyon who had 
convinced Morgan to "mix the two issues"--race and sex-in the case. She 
claimed that civil rights workers were "against the issue," saying that "to mix' 94 
up the woman issue with civil rights was to muddy the waters." 
Like the Hoyt brief, the hite brief centered on the race-sex parallel. The 
Alabama jury statute constituted an absolute mandatory exclusion "of an entire 
class based solely on the biological fact of being female." Kenyon again argued 
that with a majority of women in the workforce, the stereotype of all women as 
wives and full-time mothers who thus should be exempt from jury service was 
outdated and unreasonable. Black and white women were common victims of 
oppression and partners in liberation; in both the brief and in Kenyon's oral 
argument, Kenyon called black women "Jane Crows" and white women "Jane 
Does" and "Jane Whites. ' 95 The brief was suffused with the language of 
psychology and psychic harm; women's exclusion from juries, like racial 
segregation, enforced women's sense of social and intellectual inferiority,• 96 
Kenyon explained. The court agreed, declaring that women's exclusion from 
127. 
92. On Murray see also Susan Ware, Pauli Murray's Notable Connections, 14 J. 
WOMEN'S HIST. 54 (2002); CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX (1983); ALICE 
KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC 
CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2000); Mary Becker, The Sixties Shiff to 
FormalEquality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics,40 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 209 (1998). On the President's Commission, see Cynthia Harrison, A New 
Frontierfor Women: The PublicPolicyofthe KennedyAdministration,67 J. AM. HIST. 630 
(1980). 
93. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Charles Morgan (Nov. 29, 1965) (on file with 
Sophia Smith Library, Smith College, Kenyon Papers, Box 28). 
94. "How stupid can men be?" she confided to a colleague. "What it does actually is to 
double the impact of the Negro issue and by force of sheer numbers in a county like 
Lowndes point out the barbarous stranglehold that massive exclusion gave in these backward 
areas to a mere handful of white males." Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Charles Duncan 
(Mar. 17, 1966) (on file with Sophia Smith Library, Smith College, Kenyon Papers, Box 28, 
Folder 6). 
95. Dorothy Kenyon, Jane Crow and Lily White Males (Jan. 1966) (on file with Sophia 
Smith Library, Smith College, Kenyon Papers, Box 31). 
96. Brief for Appellant at 51-53, White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) 
(Civ. A. No. 2263-N) (on file with Smith College, Sophia Smith Library, Kenyon Papers, 
Box 28, Folder 5). 
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juries was irrational "in view of modem political, social, and economic 
conditions," and as such, the law violated women's right to constitutional equal 
protection. It ordered Lowndes County officials to "scrap all existing jury lists97 
and start afresh" without discrimination on the basis of race or sex. 
Ultimately the case was never appealed to the Supreme Court, depriving 
Kenyon of the precedent she had been hoping for. Yet the case had lasting 
impact. Only a few years after White v Crook the notion that arbitrary sex 
discrimination and sex stereotyping inflicted psychological damage to women 
and that such treatment amounted to a constitutionally cognizable injury under 
the Fourteenth Amendment had become the basis of several favorable decisions 
in sex discrimination cases. In 1967, a federal court declared unconstitutional a 
law that allowed a husband to sue for loss of consortium but forbade a wife 
from the same action, citing White v Crookfor the principle that because the 
exclusion was not based on physical differences it was therefore arbitrary andS98 
denied women their constitutional right to equal protection. Courts used 
similar reasoning to invalidate laws restricting women's work as bartenders and 
exclusion of female customers from taverns. Such differential practices based 




In 1968, Kenyon finally changed her position on sex-specific labor laws. 
Her views were influenced by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's announcement that state protective laws conflicted with Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by the growing feminist movement, which 
largely opposed protective laws, and by the influence of Pauli Murray, who had 
joined the ACLU's Equality Committee in 1966. Murray had shown Kenyon 
how race and sex exclusion both stemmed from "blacks' and women's biology 
0 0 being used as a pretext" to separate and thereby denigrate. 1 Kenyon 
eventually came to see that "the grouping of women qua women in the job 
market [was] no longer a valid distinction."1 01 Kenyon now believed that 
differential laws had to be confined to pregnancy and maternity leave, which 
97. US Asks Judges to Void Ban on Wibmen Jurorsin Alabama, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 
1965, at 11. 
98. Karczewski v. Baltimore R.R. Co., 274 F. Supp. 169, 179 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 
99. Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, 308 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969). Laws excluding women from working in taverns "arose in a different social and 
moral climate when judges, along with others, entertained Victorian ideas as to women and 
their proper place in the scheme of things." Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Assn. v. 
Borough of Hawthorne, 270 A.2d 628, 630 (N.J. 1970). 
100. Equality Committee Minutes (Dec. 1967) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton 
University, ACLU Papers). 
101. Minutes, Board of Directors, ACLU (Dec. 1968) (on file with Smith College, 
Sophia Smith Library, Kenyon Papers, Box 30). 
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dealt with legitimate "functional" differences between the sexes, and to 
compensatory legislation. She felt that laws could legitimately favor women to 
protect "equality of rights which women, because of their traditionally 
disadvantaged position in society, have themselves never been adequately able 
to assert." 2 "Any other use of the word women separately from men, when 
applied to the facts and circumstances of modem life, is in [my] judgment 
irrational because almost bound to be discriminatory against some, if not all 
women," she explained in 1970.103 
In 1970, House approval of the ERA and Murray's persuasion finally 
convinced Kenyon to change her mind on the ERA. Kenyon and Murray 
believed that the ACLU should pursue a "dual strategy" of Fourteenth 
Amendment litigation and a constitutional women's rights amendment, which 
they saw104as potentially more expedient than a judicial case-by-case 
approach. They pushed the ACLU to adopt an official statement of 
support. 105 As Kenyon wrote in a memo to the ACLU Board, 
There comes a time when you cannot wait any longer, when you must 
find new tools for the tools that have failed you. This I believe is such 
a time. I sense a groundswell of sympathy for women's cause, for the 
removal of endless numbers of small discriminations in almost every 
walk of life, which clog their footsteps and frustrate and paralyze 
many of their latent talents and potentialities. The ERA is a possible 
tool. 106 
Four days later the ACLU Board endorsed the ERA by a vote of 52 to 1. A 
year later, the ACLU's new commitment to women's rights was formalized in 
its Women's Rights Project, a unit within the national office devoted to the 
fight against legal sex discrimination. 107 
In its first Supreme Court case, the Women's Rights Project challenged an 
Idaho statute giving males preference over females in the administration of 
estates. In Reed v Reed, ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg aimed for a 
Court decision that would make sex a suspect classification. The idea of 
heightened scrutiny for sex was one that Kenyon herself had articulated in 1970 
when she argued that "the kinship between racial and sexual discrimination is 
overwhelmingly close that it should result in the addition of sex with race as 
102. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Alan Reitman (Nov. 2, 1970) (on file with Smith 
College, Sophia Smith Library, Kenyon Papers, Box 30). 
103. Id. 
104. On the development of a "dual strategy" of Fourteenth Amendment litigation and 
ERA activism among feminists, see Mayeri, supranote 9. 
105. Equality Committee Minutes (Feb. 21, 1968) (on file with Princeton University, 
Mudd Library, ACLU Papers). 
106. Letter from Pauli Murray and Dorothy Kenyon to ACLU (Sep. 23, 1970) (on file 
with Radcliffe College, Schlesinger Library, Murray Papers, Folder 856). 
107. See HARTMANN, supranote 9, at 81; Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising theBar:Ruth 
BaderGinsburgandthe ACLU Women's RightsProjec4 11 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 220 (2002). 
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suspect and invidious classifications category." 
108 
Ginsburg's brief in Reed,sometimes referred to as the "grandmother brief' 
of constitutional gender equality, drew on techniques and arguments that 
Kenyon had first used in Hoyt she argued that archaic stereotypes of women 
based on false or outmoded circumstances reinforced notions of women's 
inferiority; that such stereotyping, in denying women's individuality, harmed 
women in ways analogous to race discrimination; that blacks and women had a 
shared history of exclusion from the political process that made them both 
"discrete and insular minorities;" and that transformations both in doctrinal 
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause and in female socioeconomic 
status necessitated a reconsideration of women's constitutional rights. 
10 9 
Although the Court did not accept Ginsburg's strict scrutiny argument in Reed 
nor acknowledge the race-sex analogy, it nonetheless invalidated the Idaho 
statute under the traditional rational basis test. The biggest innovation of the 
Court in Reed was to adopt the language of a "fair and substantial" relation 
between the legislation and its object, which Ginsburg believed was a "small 
step forward" in changing the Court's position on sex discrimination.
110 
In 1973, in Frontiero v Richardson, Ginsburg similarly used historical 
analysis and sociological insight to again argue that sex should be a suspect 
classification because virtually all sex-based classifications, like racial 
classifications, inflicted a "stigma of inferiority." A four-justice plurality led by 
Justice Brennan endorsed strict scrutiny, acknowledging Ginsburg's 
sociological data and the nation's "long and unfortunate history" in which sex 
discrimination was "rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' 
which... put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage."111 In Craigv Borenin 
1976, the Court at last instituted the heightened scrutiny standard for 
administrative or statutory classifications on the basis of sex. 
Kenyon did not live to see these victories or the flourishing of a second 
wave of feminism in the 1970s, but she knew great changes in women's lives 
were near. In one of her last speeches, commenting on the reinvigoration of 
feminist activism in recent years, she wrote that it was "a great moment in 
history... if women choose to take advantage of it." At last, society was 
recognizing the importance of a true partnership between men and women and 
"the fact that each sex is dependent upon the other and neither can create 
alone." 112 The Women's Rights Project carried on Kenyon's work, "ultimately 
108. Dorothy Kenyon, Untitled, Notes (ca. 1970) (on file with Smith College, Sophia 
Smith Library, Kenyon Papers, Box 23). 
109. Brief of Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4), 1971 WL 
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110. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Comment on Reed v. Reed, 1 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 8 
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achiev[ing] the stru ge for equal protection" that Kenyon had begun nearly 
twenty years earlier. 
Kenyon's strategy was far from perfect. The ambiguities and weaknesses 
of the race-sex analogy soon became apparent, as legal feminists in the mid to 
late-1970s confronted a series of cases involving pregnancy discrimination and 
remedial affirmative action legislation designed to combat the impact of past 
sex discrimination. 114 Feminists became aware that women's traditional roles 
within the family, their distinct history of subordination, the particular 
mythology of "romantic paternalism," and the realities of reproductive biology 
make women's quest to overcome social and legal disadvantages in many ways 
more complicated than the struggle for racial justice. Yet at the time, Kenyon's 
efforts to legitimize women's rights by connecting it to what was becoming a 
revered and established American constitutional tradition-the African 
American struggle for civil rights-had been an important strategic move.115 
As legal scholar Mary Becker points out, at a time when feminism had stalled 
over the ERA debate, analogizing sex discrimination to socially and 
constitutionally proscribed race discrimination created the necessary 
momentum for feminist activism and eventual legal change. 116 
Through impact litigation and social activism, Kenyon helped build the 
foundations of modern legal feminism. Working tenaciously and often alone in 
an era without an organized feminist movement, Kenyon pursued a set of 
tactics that involved working within male-dominated social justice 
organizations, forging ties with other social movements, and reshaping 
established legal doctrine into innovative feminist legal claims. It is my hope 
that the history I have excavated in this Article will have implications both for 
the way historians study women's struggle for equal rights and the way we 
might understand that struggle in our own time. Kenyon' s unique feminist work 
and her long quest to recast the Constitution as a guarantee of women's full 
citizenship reminds us that legal feminism works along many different 
pathways to transform social meaning, social practice, and the law that brings 
them together. 
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